Reading Practice Quiz Flashcards

Read the following passage and answer the question: The following passage is from a discussion of various ways that living creatures have been classified over the years. The world can be classified in different ways, depending on one's interests and principles of clas- sification. The classifications (also known as Line taxonomies) in turn determine which comparisons 5 seem natural or unnatural, which literal or analog- ical. For example, it has been common to classify living creatures into three distinct groups—plants, animals, and humans. According to this classifica- tion, human beings are not a special kind of 10 animal, nor animals a special kind of plant. Thus any comparisons between the three groups are strictly analogical. Reasoning from inheritance in garden peas to inheritance in fruit flies, and from these two species to inheritance in human beings, 15 is sheer poetic metaphor. Another mode of classifying living creatures is commonly attributed to Aristotle. Instead of treat- ing plants, animals, and humans as distinct groups, they are nested. All living creatures 20 possess a vegetative soul that enables them to grow and metabolize. Of these, some also have a sensory soul that enables them to sense their envi- ronments and move. One species also has a rational soul that is capable of true understanding. 25 Thus, human beings are a special sort of animal, and animals are a special sort of plant. Given this classification, reasoning from human beings to all other species with respect to the attributes of the vegetative soul is legitimate, reasoning from 30 human beings to other animals with respect to the attributes of the sensory soul is also legitimate, but reasoning from the rational characteristics of the human species to any other species is merely analogical. According to both classifications, the 35 human species is unique. In the first, it has a king- dom all to itself; in the second, it stands at the pinnacle of the taxonomic hierarchy. Homo sapiens is unique. All species are. But this sort of uniqueness is not enough for many 40 (probably most) people, philosophers included. For some reason, it is very important that the species to which we belong be uniquely unique. It is of utmost importance that the human species be insulated from all other species with respect to 45 how we explain certain qualities. Human beings clearly are capable of developing and learning languages. For some reason, it is very important that the waggle dance performed by bees * not count as a genuine language. I have never been 50 able to understand why. I happen to think that the waggle dance differs from human languages to such a degree that little is gained by terming them both "languages," but even if "language" is so defined that the waggle dance slips in, bees still 55 remain bees. It is equally important to some that no other species use tools. No matter how inge- nious other species get in the manipulation of objects in their environment, it is absolutely essential that nothing they do count as "tool use." 60 I, however, fail to see what difference it makes whether any of these devices such as probes and anvils, etc. are really tools. All the species involved remain distinct biological species no matter what decisions are made. Similar observa- 65 tions hold for rationality and anything a computer might do. According to the author, what is most responsible for influencing our perception of a comparison between species?

Answer: The organizational scheme imposed on the living world by researchers and philosophers

The first paragraph explicitly states that "The world can be classified in different ways, depending on one's interests and principles of classification. The classifications (also known as taxonomies) in turn determine which comparisons seem natural or unnatural, which literal or analogical." This directly indicates that the way we categorize or organize living creatures dictates how we perceive comparisons between them.

Read the following passage and answer the question: The following passage is from a discussion of various ways that living creatures have been classified over the years. The world can be classified in different ways, depending on one's interests and principles of clas- sification. The classifications (also known as Line taxonomies) in turn determine which comparisons 5 seem natural or unnatural, which literal or analog- ical. For example, it has been common to classify living creatures into three distinct groups—plants, animals, and humans. According to this classifica- tion, human beings are not a special kind of 10 animal, nor animals a special kind of plant. Thus any comparisons between the three groups are strictly analogical. Reasoning from inheritance in garden peas to inheritance in fruit flies, and from these two species to inheritance in human beings, 15 is sheer poetic metaphor. Another mode of classifying living creatures is commonly attributed to Aristotle. Instead of treat- ing plants, animals, and humans as distinct groups, they are nested. All living creatures 20 possess a vegetative soul that enables them to grow and metabolize. Of these, some also have a sensory soul that enables them to sense their envi- ronments and move. One species also has a rational soul that is capable of true understanding. 25 Thus, human beings are a special sort of animal, and animals are a special sort of plant. Given this classification, reasoning from human beings to all other species with respect to the attributes of the vegetative soul is legitimate, reasoning from 30 human beings to other animals with respect to the attributes of the sensory soul is also legitimate, but reasoning from the rational characteristics of the human species to any other species is merely analogical. According to both classifications, the 35 human species is unique. In the first, it has a king- dom all to itself; in the second, it stands at the pinnacle of the taxonomic hierarchy. Homo sapiens is unique. All species are. But this sort of uniqueness is not enough for many 40 (probably most) people, philosophers included. For some reason, it is very important that the species to which we belong be uniquely unique. It is of utmost importance that the human species be insulated from all other species with respect to 45 how we explain certain qualities. Human beings clearly are capable of developing and learning languages. For some reason, it is very important that the waggle dance performed by bees * not count as a genuine language. I have never been 50 able to understand why. I happen to think that the waggle dance differs from human languages to such a degree that little is gained by terming them both "languages," but even if "language" is so defined that the waggle dance slips in, bees still 55 remain bees. It is equally important to some that no other species use tools. No matter how inge- nious other species get in the manipulation of objects in their environment, it is absolutely essential that nothing they do count as "tool use." 60 I, however, fail to see what difference it makes whether any of these devices such as probes and anvils, etc. are really tools. All the species involved remain distinct biological species no matter what decisions are made. Similar observa- 65 tions hold for rationality and anything a computer might do. Which of the following is NOT possible within an Aristotelian classification scheme?

Answer: A species having vegetative and rational souls while lacking a sensory soul

The Aristotelian scheme described is a nested hierarchy: all living creatures have a vegetative soul, some of these also have a sensory soul, and one species (humans) also has a rational soul. This means that to possess a rational soul, a species *must* also possess a sensory soul, and to possess a sensory soul, it *must* also possess a vegetative soul. Therefore, a species having a rational soul but lacking a sensory soul breaks this nested structure and is not possible.

Read the following passage and answer the question: The following passage is from a discussion of various ways that living creatures have been classified over the years. The world can be classified in different ways, depending on one's interests and principles of clas- sification. The classifications (also known as Line taxonomies) in turn determine which comparisons 5 seem natural or unnatural, which literal or analog- ical. For example, it has been common to classify living creatures into three distinct groups—plants, animals, and humans. According to this classifica- tion, human beings are not a special kind of 10 animal, nor animals a special kind of plant. Thus any comparisons between the three groups are strictly analogical. Reasoning from inheritance in garden peas to inheritance in fruit flies, and from these two species to inheritance in human beings, 15 is sheer poetic metaphor. Another mode of classifying living creatures is commonly attributed to Aristotle. Instead of treat- ing plants, animals, and humans as distinct groups, they are nested. All living creatures 20 possess a vegetative soul that enables them to grow and metabolize. Of these, some also have a sensory soul that enables them to sense their envi- ronments and move. One species also has a rational soul that is capable of true understanding. 25 Thus, human beings are a special sort of animal, and animals are a special sort of plant. Given this classification, reasoning from human beings to all other species with respect to the attributes of the vegetative soul is legitimate, reasoning from 30 human beings to other animals with respect to the attributes of the sensory soul is also legitimate, but reasoning from the rational characteristics of the human species to any other species is merely analogical. According to both classifications, the 35 human species is unique. In the first, it has a king- dom all to itself; in the second, it stands at the pinnacle of the taxonomic hierarchy. Homo sapiens is unique. All species are. But this sort of uniqueness is not enough for many 40 (probably most) people, philosophers included. For some reason, it is very important that the species to which we belong be uniquely unique. It is of utmost importance that the human species be insulated from all other species with respect to 45 how we explain certain qualities. Human beings clearly are capable of developing and learning languages. For some reason, it is very important that the waggle dance performed by bees * not count as a genuine language. I have never been 50 able to understand why. I happen to think that the waggle dance differs from human languages to such a degree that little is gained by terming them both "languages," but even if "language" is so defined that the waggle dance slips in, bees still 55 remain bees. It is equally important to some that no other species use tools. No matter how inge- nious other species get in the manipulation of objects in their environment, it is absolutely essential that nothing they do count as "tool use." 60 I, however, fail to see what difference it makes whether any of these devices such as probes and anvils, etc. are really tools. All the species involved remain distinct biological species no matter what decisions are made. Similar observa- 65 tions hold for rationality and anything a computer might do. Which of the following comparisons would be "legitimate" for all living organisms according to the Aristotelian scheme described in paragraph two? I. Comparisons based on the vegetative soul II. Comparisons based on the sensory soul III. Comparisons based on the rational soul

Answer: I only

The passage states that "All living creatures possess a vegetative soul." This means the vegetative soul is common to *all* organisms in the Aristotelian scheme. Therefore, comparisons based on the vegetative soul would be legitimate for all living organisms, while sensory and rational souls are not universally present.

Read the following passage and answer the question: The following passage is from a discussion of various ways that living creatures have been classified over the years. The world can be classified in different ways, depending on one's interests and principles of clas- sification. The classifications (also known as Line taxonomies) in turn determine which comparisons 5 seem natural or unnatural, which literal or analog- ical. For example, it has been common to classify living creatures into three distinct groups—plants, animals, and humans. According to this classifica- tion, human beings are not a special kind of 10 animal, nor animals a special kind of plant. Thus any comparisons between the three groups are strictly analogical. Reasoning from inheritance in garden peas to inheritance in fruit flies, and from these two species to inheritance in human beings, 15 is sheer poetic metaphor. Another mode of classifying living creatures is commonly attributed to Aristotle. Instead of treat- ing plants, animals, and humans as distinct groups, they are nested. All living creatures 20 possess a vegetative soul that enables them to grow and metabolize. Of these, some also have a sensory soul that enables them to sense their envi- ronments and move. One species also has a rational soul that is capable of true understanding. 25 Thus, human beings are a special sort of animal, and animals are a special sort of plant. Given this classification, reasoning from human beings to all other species with respect to the attributes of the vegetative soul is legitimate, reasoning from 30 human beings to other animals with respect to the attributes of the sensory soul is also legitimate, but reasoning from the rational characteristics of the human species to any other species is merely analogical. According to both classifications, the 35 human species is unique. In the first, it has a king- dom all to itself; in the second, it stands at the pinnacle of the taxonomic hierarchy. Homo sapiens is unique. All species are. But this sort of uniqueness is not enough for many 40 (probably most) people, philosophers included. For some reason, it is very important that the species to which we belong be uniquely unique. It is of utmost importance that the human species be insulated from all other species with respect to 45 how we explain certain qualities. Human beings clearly are capable of developing and learning languages. For some reason, it is very important that the waggle dance performed by bees * not count as a genuine language. I have never been 50 able to understand why. I happen to think that the waggle dance differs from human languages to such a degree that little is gained by terming them both "languages," but even if "language" is so defined that the waggle dance slips in, bees still 55 remain bees. It is equally important to some that no other species use tools. No matter how inge- nious other species get in the manipulation of objects in their environment, it is absolutely essential that nothing they do count as "tool use." 60 I, however, fail to see what difference it makes whether any of these devices such as probes and anvils, etc. are really tools. All the species involved remain distinct biological species no matter what decisions are made. Similar observa- 65 tions hold for rationality and anything a computer might do. If the author had wished to explain why "most" people (line 40) feel the way they do, the explanation would have probably focused on the

Answer: lack of objectivity in the classification of Homo sapiens

The author expresses bewilderment ("I have never been able to understand why," "I, however, fail to see what difference it makes") at people's insistence that humans are "uniquely unique" and must be "insulated from all other species" regarding qualities like language and tool use. This suggests that the author views this insistence as a subjective bias or a desire to maintain human exceptionalism, rather than an objective scientific classification. Therefore, an explanation would likely focus on this lack of objectivity.

Read the following passage and answer the question: The following passage is from a discussion of various ways that living creatures have been classified over the years. The world can be classified in different ways, depending on one's interests and principles of clas- sification. The classifications (also known as Line taxonomies) in turn determine which comparisons 5 seem natural or unnatural, which literal or analog- ical. For example, it has been common to classify living creatures into three distinct groups—plants, animals, and humans. According to this classifica- tion, human beings are not a special kind of 10 animal, nor animals a special kind of plant. Thus any comparisons between the three groups are strictly analogical. Reasoning from inheritance in garden peas to inheritance in fruit flies, and from these two species to inheritance in human beings, 15 is sheer poetic metaphor. Another mode of classifying living creatures is commonly attributed to Aristotle. Instead of treat- ing plants, animals, and humans as distinct groups, they are nested. All living creatures 20 possess a vegetative soul that enables them to grow and metabolize. Of these, some also have a sensory soul that enables them to sense their envi- ronments and move. One species also has a rational soul that is capable of true understanding. 25 Thus, human beings are a special sort of animal, and animals are a special sort of plant. Given this classification, reasoning from human beings to all other species with respect to the attributes of the vegetative soul is legitimate, reasoning from 30 human beings to other animals with respect to the attributes of the sensory soul is also legitimate, but reasoning from the rational characteristics of the human species to any other species is merely analogical. According to both classifications, the 35 human species is unique. In the first, it has a king- dom all to itself; in the second, it stands at the pinnacle of the taxonomic hierarchy. Homo sapiens is unique. All species are. But this sort of uniqueness is not enough for many 40 (probably most) people, philosophers included. For some reason, it is very important that the species to which we belong be uniquely unique. It is of utmost importance that the human species be insulated from all other species with respect to 45 how we explain certain qualities. Human beings clearly are capable of developing and learning languages. For some reason, it is very important that the waggle dance performed by bees * not count as a genuine language. I have never been 50 able to understand why. I happen to think that the waggle dance differs from human languages to such a degree that little is gained by terming them both "languages," but even if "language" is so defined that the waggle dance slips in, bees still 55 remain bees. It is equally important to some that no other species use tools. No matter how inge- nious other species get in the manipulation of objects in their environment, it is absolutely essential that nothing they do count as "tool use." 60 I, however, fail to see what difference it makes whether any of these devices such as probes and anvils, etc. are really tools. All the species involved remain distinct biological species no matter what decisions are made. Similar observa- 65 tions hold for rationality and anything a computer might do. The author uses the words "For some reason" in lines 40-41 to express

Answer: disapproval

The author uses "For some reason" repeatedly to introduce the idea that people insist on human "uniquely unique" status and deny other species certain human-like qualities (like language or tool use). The subsequent phrase, "I have never been able to understand why," clearly indicates the author's disagreement and implicit criticism of this viewpoint. This phrasing conveys a sense of mild disapproval or bewilderment at what the author perceives as an irrational or biased human tendency.

Read the following passage and answer the question: The following passage is from a discussion of various ways that living creatures have been classified over the years. The world can be classified in different ways, depending on one's interests and principles of clas- sification. The classifications (also known as Line taxonomies) in turn determine which comparisons 5 seem natural or unnatural, which literal or analog- ical. For example, it has been common to classify living creatures into three distinct groups—plants, animals, and humans. According to this classifica- tion, human beings are not a special kind of 10 animal, nor animals a special kind of plant. Thus any comparisons between the three groups are strictly analogical. Reasoning from inheritance in garden peas to inheritance in fruit flies, and from these two species to inheritance in human beings, 15 is sheer poetic metaphor. Another mode of classifying living creatures is commonly attributed to Aristotle. Instead of treat- ing plants, animals, and humans as distinct groups, they are nested. All living creatures 20 possess a vegetative soul that enables them to grow and metabolize. Of these, some also have a sensory soul that enables them to sense their envi- ronments and move. One species also has a rational soul that is capable of true understanding. 25 Thus, human beings are a special sort of animal, and animals are a special sort of plant. Given this classification, reasoning from human beings to all other species with respect to the attributes of the vegetative soul is legitimate, reasoning from 30 human beings to other animals with respect to the attributes of the sensory soul is also legitimate, but reasoning from the rational characteristics of the human species to any other species is merely analogical. According to both classifications, the 35 human species is unique. In the first, it has a king- dom all to itself; in the second, it stands at the pinnacle of the taxonomic hierarchy. Homo sapiens is unique. All species are. But this sort of uniqueness is not enough for many 40 (probably most) people, philosophers included. For some reason, it is very important that the species to which we belong be uniquely unique. It is of utmost importance that the human species be insulated from all other species with respect to 45 how we explain certain qualities. Human beings clearly are capable of developing and learning languages. For some reason, it is very important that the waggle dance performed by bees * not count as a genuine language. I have never been 50 able to understand why. I happen to think that the waggle dance differs from human languages to such a degree that little is gained by terming them both "languages," but even if "language" is so defined that the waggle dance slips in, bees still 55 remain bees. It is equally important to some that no other species use tools. No matter how inge- nious other species get in the manipulation of objects in their environment, it is absolutely essential that nothing they do count as "tool use." 60 I, however, fail to see what difference it makes whether any of these devices such as probes and anvils, etc. are really tools. All the species involved remain distinct biological species no matter what decisions are made. Similar observa- 65 tions hold for rationality and anything a computer might do. Which best summarizes the idea of "uniquely unique" (line 42)?

Answer: We are defined by attributes that we alone possess and that are qualitatively different from those of other species.

The passage explains "uniquely unique" by stating it's important for humans to be "insulated from all other species with respect to how we explain certain qualities." The examples given (bees' waggle dance not counting as "genuine language," other species not using "tools") illustrate a desire to define human attributes as fundamentally different and exclusive, rather than merely a matter of degree. This implies a qualitative distinction that sets humans apart.

Read the following passage and answer the question: The following passage is from a discussion of various ways that living creatures have been classified over the years. The world can be classified in different ways, depending on one's interests and principles of clas- sification. The classifications (also known as Line taxonomies) in turn determine which comparisons 5 seem natural or unnatural, which literal or analog- ical. For example, it has been common to classify living creatures into three distinct groups—plants, animals, and humans. According to this classifica- tion, human beings are not a special kind of 10 animal, nor animals a special kind of plant. Thus any comparisons between the three groups are strictly analogical. Reasoning from inheritance in garden peas to inheritance in fruit flies, and from these two species to inheritance in human beings, 15 is sheer poetic metaphor. Another mode of classifying living creatures is commonly attributed to Aristotle. Instead of treat- ing plants, animals, and humans as distinct groups, they are nested. All living creatures 20 possess a vegetative soul that enables them to grow and metabolize. Of these, some also have a sensory soul that enables them to sense their envi- ronments and move. One species also has a rational soul that is capable of true understanding. 25 Thus, human beings are a special sort of animal, and animals are a special sort of plant. Given this classification, reasoning from human beings to all other species with respect to the attributes of the vegetative soul is legitimate, reasoning from 30 human beings to other animals with respect to the attributes of the sensory soul is also legitimate, but reasoning from the rational characteristics of the human species to any other species is merely analogical. According to both classifications, the 35 human species is unique. In the first, it has a king- dom all to itself; in the second, it stands at the pinnacle of the taxonomic hierarchy. Homo sapiens is unique. All species are. But this sort of uniqueness is not enough for many 40 (probably most) people, philosophers included. For some reason, it is very important that the species to which we belong be uniquely unique. It is of utmost importance that the human species be insulated from all other species with respect to 45 how we explain certain qualities. Human beings clearly are capable of developing and learning languages. For some reason, it is very important that the waggle dance performed by bees * not count as a genuine language. I have never been 50 able to understand why. I happen to think that the waggle dance differs from human languages to such a degree that little is gained by terming them both "languages," but even if "language" is so defined that the waggle dance slips in, bees still 55 remain bees. It is equally important to some that no other species use tools. No matter how inge- nious other species get in the manipulation of objects in their environment, it is absolutely essential that nothing they do count as "tool use." 60 I, however, fail to see what difference it makes whether any of these devices such as probes and anvils, etc. are really tools. All the species involved remain distinct biological species no matter what decisions are made. Similar observa- 65 tions hold for rationality and anything a computer might do. In line 44, "insulated from" means

Answer: segregated from

In this context, "insulated from" refers to the idea of keeping human qualities separate and distinct from those of other species. The author is describing a human tendency to prevent comparisons or shared definitions of traits like language or tool use with animals. "Segregated from" accurately captures this meaning of being set apart or separated in classification and explanation.

Read the following passage and answer the question: The following passage is from a discussion of various ways that living creatures have been classified over the years. The world can be classified in different ways, depending on one's interests and principles of clas- sification. The classifications (also known as Line taxonomies) in turn determine which comparisons 5 seem natural or unnatural, which literal or analog- ical. For example, it has been common to classify living creatures into three distinct groups—plants, animals, and humans. According to this classifica- tion, human beings are not a special kind of 10 animal, nor animals a special kind of plant. Thus any comparisons between the three groups are strictly analogical. Reasoning from inheritance in garden peas to inheritance in fruit flies, and from these two species to inheritance in human beings, 15 is sheer poetic metaphor. Another mode of classifying living creatures is commonly attributed to Aristotle. Instead of treat- ing plants, animals, and humans as distinct groups, they are nested. All living creatures 20 possess a vegetative soul that enables them to grow and metabolize. Of these, some also have a sensory soul that enables them to sense their envi- ronments and move. One species also has a rational soul that is capable of true understanding. 25 Thus, human beings are a special sort of animal, and animals are a special sort of plant. Given this classification, reasoning from human beings to all other species with respect to the attributes of the vegetative soul is legitimate, reasoning from 30 human beings to other animals with respect to the attributes of the sensory soul is also legitimate, but reasoning from the rational characteristics of the human species to any other species is merely analogical. According to both classifications, the 35 human species is unique. In the first, it has a king- dom all to itself; in the second, it stands at the pinnacle of the taxonomic hierarchy. Homo sapiens is unique. All species are. But this sort of uniqueness is not enough for many 40 (probably most) people, philosophers included. For some reason, it is very important that the species to which we belong be uniquely unique. It is of utmost importance that the human species be insulated from all other species with respect to 45 how we explain certain qualities. Human beings clearly are capable of developing and learning languages. For some reason, it is very important that the waggle dance performed by bees * not count as a genuine language. I have never been 50 able to understand why. I happen to think that the waggle dance differs from human languages to such a degree that little is gained by terming them both "languages," but even if "language" is so defined that the waggle dance slips in, bees still 55 remain bees. It is equally important to some that no other species use tools. No matter how inge- nious other species get in the manipulation of objects in their environment, it is absolutely essential that nothing they do count as "tool use." 60 I, however, fail to see what difference it makes whether any of these devices such as probes and anvils, etc. are really tools. All the species involved remain distinct biological species no matter what decisions are made. Similar observa- 65 tions hold for rationality and anything a computer might do. In the third paragraph, the author criticizes those who believe that

Answer: Homo sapiens and animals belong to separate and distinct divisions of the living world

The author criticizes the desire for humans to be "uniquely unique" and "insulated from all other species" regarding certain qualities like language and tool use. This insistence on qualitative differences, rather than just quantitative ones, reflects a belief that humans occupy a fundamentally separate category from animals. The author finds this distinction unnecessary and questions its importance, implying a criticism of those who uphold such a rigid separation.