Landmark Supreme Court Cases Flashcards

In McCulloch v. Maryland (1819), the Supreme Court ruled that Maryland could not tax the Second Bank of the United States. Chief Justice Marshall's opinion rested on two distinct constitutional principles. Which pairing correctly identifies BOTH holdings of the case?

Answer: Congress has implied powers to charter a bank under the Necessary and Proper Clause, AND states cannot constitutionally tax federal instrumentalities

McCulloch v. Maryland produced two landmark holdings: (1) Congress possesses implied powers beyond those expressly listed, derived from the Necessary and Proper Clause — so chartering a national bank was constitutional even without explicit textual authorization; and (2) the Supremacy Clause prevents states from taxing federal instrumentalities, because 'the power to tax involves the power to destroy.' The Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment were not the bases of either holding.

The Supreme Court's decision in Korematsu v. United States (1944) upheld the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II. Decades later, the Court's 2018 ruling in Trump v. Hawaii explicitly addressed Korematsu. What was the significance of that 2018 reference?

Answer: The Court formally overruled Korematsu, declaring it wrong the day it was decided, while simultaneously upholding the travel ban on different national-security grounds

In Trump v. Hawaii (2018), Chief Justice Roberts wrote that Korematsu was 'gravely wrong the day it was decided' and formally overruled it — the first explicit repudiation of the 1944 decision. However, the Court simultaneously upheld the travel ban on national-security grounds, finding it facially neutral and within presidential statutory authority. This made the ruling notable for burying bad precedent even while reaching a controversial result.

In Engel v. Vitale (1962), the Supreme Court struck down state-composed prayer in public schools. A school district argues its policy is distinguishable because the prayer was student-written and participation is entirely voluntary. Under the Court's subsequent Establishment Clause jurisprudence, which factor would MOST likely determine whether this policy is still unconstitutional?

Answer: Whether a reasonable observer would perceive the school as endorsing religion, regardless of voluntary participation

Post-Engel cases, particularly Lee v. Weisman (1992) and the endorsement test articulated in Lynch v. Donnelly, established that the key inquiry is whether a reasonable observer would perceive governmental endorsement of religion — not merely whether participation is voluntary. Coercion (even subtle peer or school pressure) and the appearance of state endorsement are both independently sufficient to violate the Establishment Clause. Majority consent has never been a constitutional defense.

Shelby County v. Holder (2013) gutted a key provision of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The Court did NOT strike down Section 5 (the preclearance requirement itself) but instead invalidated Section 4(b). What was Section 4(b), and why did striking it effectively nullify preclearance?

Answer: Section 4(b) was the coverage formula that identified which jurisdictions had to seek preclearance; without it, no jurisdiction could be required to comply with Section 5

Section 4(b) contained the coverage formula — the criteria used to determine which states and jurisdictions were subject to the preclearance requirement of Section 5. The Court found that the 1965 formula (based on 1964 voting data) was outdated and no longer rationally related to current conditions. Because Section 5 only applies to covered jurisdictions, and Section 4(b) was the mechanism for defining those jurisdictions, invalidating 4(b) meant that no jurisdiction remained legally obligated to seek preclearance under Section 5.

In Kelo v. City of New London (2005), the Supreme Court expanded the government's eminent domain power in a controversial 5-4 decision. Which of the following most accurately describes the constitutional limit the Court STILL preserved, even while ruling for the city?

Answer: The government may not take private property and transfer it directly to another private party solely for that party's private benefit with no plausible public purpose

Kelo held that economic development qualifies as a 'public use' under the Fifth Amendment, permitting the city to condemn private homes for a private developer's revitalization project. However, Justice Stevens's majority opinion expressly preserved the principle that a 'pretext' taking — one where the stated public purpose is merely a cover for transferring property to a private party for purely private gain — would still be unconstitutional. The decision did not authorize unlimited takings; it required only a plausible public benefit, not direct public ownership or use.

The Supreme Court's decision in Citizens United v. FEC (2010) overruled two precedents: Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce (1990) and part of McConnell v. FEC (2003). On what constitutional ground did the Court strike down limits on independent corporate political expenditures, and what specific type of spending did the ruling leave Congress still permitted to restrict?

Answer: The Court held that spending money on political speech is protected by the First Amendment regardless of corporate identity, but upheld disclosure requirements and the ban on direct contributions to candidates

Citizens United rested on First Amendment free speech grounds — the Court held that political speech does not lose protection simply because its source is a corporation, and that restricting independent expenditures (spending not coordinated with a campaign) could not survive strict scrutiny. Crucially, the ruling explicitly upheld two things Congress could still regulate: (1) mandatory disclosure and disclaimer requirements for political ads, and (2) the longstanding ban on direct contributions from corporate treasuries to candidates or parties. The PAC structure requirement for direct contributions was not eliminated.