Constitution Flashcards
6 cards from real FCLE practice questions. Tap to flip, then mark Knew It or Still Learning — missed cards come back until you master them.
Read the first 6 Constitution flashcards as text
The Constitution's Supremacy Clause (Article VI) establishes federal law as the 'supreme law of the land.' Which of the following scenarios correctly applies this clause?
Answer: A federal treaty ratified by the Senate supersedes a conflicting state constitutional provision.
The Supremacy Clause makes the Constitution, federal laws, and treaties the supreme law of the land, binding on state judges even if state constitutions or laws say otherwise. A ratified treaty carries the same weight as federal law and overrides conflicting state constitutional provisions. Option A is wrong because the order of enactment is irrelevant. Option C is wrong because Congress cannot override a constitutional ruling through ordinary legislation. Option D confuses the Tenth Amendment's reservation of powers with the Supremacy Clause's operation.
Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution prohibits Congress from suspending the writ of habeas corpus 'unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.' During the Civil War, President Lincoln suspended habeas corpus by executive order. What does this constitutional dispute illustrate?
Answer: The placement of the habeas corpus clause in Article I creates a textual argument that only Congress, not the President, holds suspension power.
Because the habeas corpus suspension clause appears in Article I (which governs Congress), constitutional scholars and Chief Justice Taney in Ex parte Merryman argued that only Congress possesses this power. Lincoln's unilateral executive suspension was therefore constitutionally contested. Option A overstates Commander-in-Chief power — it does not explicitly grant suspension authority. Option C is incorrect; courts have ruled on habeas petitions during national emergencies. Option D is wrong because the Bill of Rights does not independently create a suspension clause.
The Constitution's Contract Clause (Article I, Section 10) prohibits states from passing laws 'impairing the Obligation of Contracts.' In Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819), the Supreme Court extended this protection to corporate charters. Which of the following best identifies the modern limitation the Court later placed on the Contract Clause?
Answer: States may impair contracts when doing so is a reasonable and necessary exercise of the state's police powers to protect public health, safety, or welfare.
The Supreme Court has held that the Contract Clause is not absolute. In cases like Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell (1934), the Court ruled that states may impair contractual obligations when the impairment is reasonable and necessary to serve a significant and legitimate public purpose — the exercise of police powers. Option A is wrong because Dartmouth specifically extended protection to government-issued charters. Option C is incorrect; the Contract Clause was not repealed or supplanted by the Fourteenth Amendment. Option D is wrong because federal courts do review Contract Clause claims.
The Constitution establishes three methods by which a constitutional amendment can be proposed and ratified. Which combination is constitutionally valid but has NEVER been used in U.S. history?
Answer: Proposal by a national constitutional convention called by two-thirds of state legislatures; ratification by three-fourths of state legislatures.
Article V provides two proposal methods and two ratification methods, creating four theoretical combinations. All 27 amendments were proposed by Congress (not by a constitutional convention). The 21st Amendment is the only one ratified by state conventions rather than state legislatures. A convention-proposed amendment ratified by state legislatures (Option B) is constitutionally valid under Article V but has never occurred — no constitutional convention has ever been convened under Article V. Option D has also never been used, but Option B is the clearest textbook example of an unused-but-valid method that appears on civic literacy exams.
The Necessary and Proper Clause (Article I, Section 8) grants Congress power to make laws 'necessary and proper' for carrying out its enumerated powers. In McCulloch v. Maryland (1819), Chief Justice Marshall interpreted this clause broadly. Which of the following statements accurately reflects the Court's reasoning?
Answer: 'Necessary' means useful or conducive to the end sought, giving Congress wide discretion in choosing the means to execute enumerated powers.
Marshall rejected the narrow reading that 'necessary' means indispensable. He held that it means 'useful,' 'conducive to,' or 'calculated to produce the end' — granting Congress broad flexibility in selecting the means to carry out its enumerated powers. The Court upheld the constitutionality of the Bank and struck down Maryland's tax on it (making Option D wrong). Option A reflects the narrower interpretation Marshall explicitly rejected. Option B is wrong because the Necessary and Proper Clause is an auxiliary power that expands enumerated powers, not a freestanding grant.
The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause has produced three tiers of judicial scrutiny. When a law classifies people based on race or national origin, courts apply strict scrutiny. Which of the following correctly states the burden of proof under strict scrutiny?
Answer: The government must prove the law is necessary to achieve a compelling government interest and is narrowly tailored to that end.
Under strict scrutiny — applied to laws that classify by race, national origin, or infringe fundamental rights — the government bears the burden of proving the law serves a compelling government interest AND is narrowly tailored (or the least restrictive means) to achieve it. Option A describes rational basis review, where the challenger bears the burden. Option B describes intermediate scrutiny, applied to gender classifications. Option D conflates the standard with the separate discriminatory-intent doctrine from Washington v. Davis — intent matters for triggering strict scrutiny, but the standard itself is about government justification.