Constitutional Law MBE Practice Test 2026 — Questions and Answers

Question 1: A church located in a western state was a branch of a church originating in a South American country. It received a large shipment from its home church of a special hallucinogenic tea that is used in the church’s sacramental religious services. The federal government seized the shipment, preventing the religious use of the tea. The church filed for an injunction requesting permission to import the tea for religious purposes and to prohibit any federal prosecutions. The government presented no evidence as to the dangers of the tea or reasons to outlaw it other than an analysis of its ingredients contained a natural chemical compound that was listed as a Schedule I prohibited substance. What is the most likely decision of the federal district court to the petition of the church?

The injunction will be granted because the government did not prove a compelling government interest in interfering with this particular religious practice. (Correct answer)
The injunction will be denied because the inclusion in the tea of a Schedule I substance is in itself proof of a compelling government interest.
The injunction will be denied because a church from South America is not entitled to have its branches in this country exempted from the drug laws for religious reasons.
The injunction will be granted because the government cannot under any circumstances interfere with religious freedom.

Correct answer: The injunction will be granted because the government did not prove a compelling government interest in interfering with this particular religious practice.

Under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), the federal government must demonstrate a compelling government interest and use the least restrictive means when a federal law substantially burdens a person's exercise of religion. Since the government provided no evidence of danger or specific reasons to outlaw the tea beyond its Schedule I classification, it failed to meet the compelling interest test required to justify interfering with the church's religious practice.

Question 2: A grower based in one state grew and marketed corn nationwide. The U.S. Congress passed a law attempting to stabilize the price of corn by limiting the volume of corn produced by growers to a specified volume per each cubic acre, on a semi-annual basis. The Department of Agriculture fined the grower for exceeding the production volume. He only intended to use the excess for feeding his livestock and domestic purposes, but he was ordered to destroy it. The grower brought an action claiming that his substantive due process rights had been illegally interfered with. He asked for an injunction and reparations. What would be the most likely decision of the court?

No relief was granted because Congress has the power to regulate interstate commerce, and even though he used the excess corn internally, it reduced the feed that he had to buy, thus having an effect on interstate commerce. (Correct answer)
The fact that he used the excess corn and did not ship it resulted in no effect on interstate commerce, and the government’s actions would be enjoined as being beyond the power authorized by the Commerce Clause.
Relief would be granted because the Commerce Clause does not authorize the regulation of indirect influences on interstate commerce, making this action illegal.
No relief was granted because the Supreme Court has made it clear in numerous cases that the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce is unlimited and unrestricted.

Correct answer: No relief was granted because Congress has the power to regulate interstate commerce, and even though he used the excess corn internally, it reduced the feed that he had to buy, thus having an effect on interstate commerce.

This scenario is analogous to *Wickard v. Filburn*, where the Supreme Court held that Congress's Commerce Clause power extends to regulating purely intrastate activities if, in the aggregate, they substantially affect interstate commerce. Even though the grower used the excess corn for personal livestock, this reduced his demand for purchased feed, thereby impacting the overall interstate market for corn and feed, thus falling within Congress's regulatory authority.

Question 3: A regional planning commission ordered a temporary cessation of all construction in a large planned residential development in order to formulate a comprehensive land-use plan, and to study the environmental impact on a large natural lake adjoining the property. After some 24 months the moratorium still existed, and real estate developers sued, alleging that the moratorium constituted a taking of their property without due compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. A lower federal court held a hearing, heard evidence, and ruled that the delay under these facts was not unreasonable and no taking occurred. How would the federal court of appeals most likely decide the issue?

The temporary cessation was not the same as a total restriction on further development and didn’t ultimately deprive the owners of all economic uses of their property. (Correct answer)
A temporary moratorium denies the developers of all economic use of their land during the cessation, and compensation was payable.
The moratorium was an attempt by the government to appropriate private land for public use during an inordinate period of time, thus requiring compensation.
No compensation is ever due when all that is involved is a regulatory intrusion on the use of one’s property.

Correct answer: The temporary cessation was not the same as a total restriction on further development and didn’t ultimately deprive the owners of all economic uses of their property.

A temporary moratorium on development, especially for planning purposes, is generally not considered a compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment if it is reasonable in duration and does not permanently deprive the owner of all economically viable use of their land. The court's finding that the 24-month delay was not unreasonable supports the conclusion that the developers were not ultimately deprived of all economic uses, distinguishing it from a permanent taking.

Question 4: A city park accepted a limited number of privately funded and donated monuments. One of them was a monument displaying the Ten Commandments, which the Kiwanis International donated in a campaign against juvenile delinquency 50 years ago. A non-denominational church organization recently demanded that the city provide space in the park for the church to erect a monument giving the seven precepts of the church. The city rejected the request, and the church sued the city requesting injunctive action to compel the city to provide space for its religious display. The church argued that the city was in violation of the religious establishment clause of the First Amendment by allowing the Ten Commandments. The church said that the monument was an establishment of religion and that all religions should be allowed to display equally or none should be allowed. Based on modern precedent, what will the court decide?

The First Amendment requires that every expression and form of speech be allowed by a government agency and thus the new monument must be allowed.
The city must allow a fair selection of monuments from all religions or be guilty of establishing a religion by appearing to favor one religious heritage only.
The city can accept a monument that also has historical, non-sectarian interest without violating the establishment clause and without having to accept other monuments. (Correct answer)
The placing of a monument that has any religious significance at all is always a violation of the establishment clause, and the Ten Commandments must be removed.

Correct answer: The city can accept a monument that also has historical, non-sectarian interest without violating the establishment clause and without having to accept other monuments.

Simply having religious content or promoting a message consistent with a religious doctrine does not run afoul of the Establishment Clause. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U. S. 677, 690 (2005) There is a sufficiently secular message of the Ten Commandments. They have undeniable historical meaning in the American heritage. A non-religious organization donated it for non-religious purposes, and it went unchallenged for 50 years. A reasonable observer, mindful of the history, purpose, and context, would not conclude that this passive monument conveyed the message that the State was seeking to endorse religion, even though it also had to be recognized that the Ten Commandments had religious significance. Id. at 545 U. S. 682-683. See also Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819, 845-846 (1995) (warning against the "risk [of] fostering a pervasive bias or hostility to religion, which could undermine the very neutrality the Establishment Clause requires").

Question 5: A developer purchased two lots of ocean front property. He intended to build two single-family high-end homes like adjacent homes built in the surrounding areas. Two years later, the state passed a beachfront protection statute that prohibited the developer from building on his lots. The developer filed a claim in state court demanding compensation for a taking of his property under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments because the state denied all economic uses of the property. The trial court agreed that the property was now economically useless, and awarded compensation to the developer. However, on appeal the supreme court of the state reversed. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Did the U.S. Supreme Court grant the developer’s plea for compensation based on an unconstitutional taking of his property by the state?

No, the valid exercise of the police powers by the state cannot result in a claim for compensation by a property owner.
No, the statute did not forbid all uses of the property; there were still social and recreational uses that remained.
Yes, any interference with a landowner’s interest in building commercial property is prohibited by the due process clause and requires compensation.
Yes, compensation is payable for a taking of property where a statute or regulation takes away all economic use of the land. (Correct answer)

Correct answer: Yes, compensation is payable for a taking of property where a statute or regulation takes away all economic use of the land.

The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that private property shall not “be taken for public use, without just compensation.” Lingle v. Chevron USA Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 536-37. When the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking for which reasonable compensation must be paid. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019, 1027 (1992).

Question 6: A state’s voters approved an amendment to the state’s constitution that prevented any city, town, or county in the state from taking any legislative, executive, or judicial action to recognize gay and lesbian individuals as a protected class. The state’s highest court ruled that the measure could not pass strict scrutiny, and was a denial of equal protection for gays and lesbians. The proponents of the act appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. What will the Court decide with respect to the validity of the law?

The law was passed by a referendum majority vote of the people of the state and is thus constitutional and valid under state law.
The law is an appropriate measure because it merely denies preferential treatment to homosexuals and has no substantive effect on them.
The law is unconstitutional because it was not appropriately ratified by the executive and judicial branches of the government.
The law is unconstitutional because it lacks a rational relation to any legitimate government purpose and the denial of the right to seek protection is unprecedented in our jurisprudence. (Correct answer)

Correct answer: The law is unconstitutional because it lacks a rational relation to any legitimate government purpose and the denial of the right to seek protection is unprecedented in our jurisprudence.

Although strict scrutiny is an appropriate test, the preliminary question to answer is whether the the amendment consists of any rational purpose that furthers a legitimate government interest. If the amendment or statute does not further a legitimate government interest because it has no rational basis, then you don't need to go to next step and analyze it from the perspective of "strict scrutiny." The first test to apply is the rational basis inquiry: the law is so outrageous that it does NOT have a legitimate government interest. It is based solely on malicious animosity toward a class of people. This law was born of the bare desire to harm an unpopular group of people. This cannot constitute a legitimate government purpose. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).

Question 7: A state statute provides that any public official found guilty of misconduct in office by his superiors should be permanently banned from holding any state employment or being appointed to any state office at any time in the future. Would the statute pass constitutional muster and why?

The statute is unconstitutional as a bill of attainder. (Correct answer)
The statute is unconstitutional because it is void-for-vagueness.
The statute is a constitutional exercise of the police power.
The statute is a constitutional statement of public policy.

Correct answer: The statute is unconstitutional as a bill of attainder.

A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without a judicial trial. It applies either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial. Example: U.S. v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965).

Question 8: A state passed a statute that prevents the sale of violent video games to minors. The act prohibits video games being sold or rented to minors where the player may have a choice of killing, maiming, dismembering or sexually assaulting an image of a human being in a manner that appeals to a deviant or morbid interest of minors and offends prevailing community standards of what is suitable for minors. The Petitioners, representing various interests of the video game industry, brought an action in federal court to have the statute declared unconstitutional. The video game industry has a voluntary rating system (like the one relating to movies) to assist parents. The state did not present evidence showing a connection between violent videos and violence in children. Based on U.S. Supreme Court precedence, what is the most likely decision of the federal court?

The statute is unconstitutional because it is does not meet a compelling state interest that would allow for restrictions on free speech. (Correct answer)
The statute is constitutional because it meets a compelling government interest and it is drawn narrowly to fit very specific dangers.
The statute is unconstitutional because minors have unlimited rights under the First Amendment.
The statute is constitutional because the restrictions are obviously going to reduce the crime rate among minors.

Correct answer: The statute is unconstitutional because it is does not meet a compelling state interest that would allow for restrictions on free speech.

See Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011), pertaining to a very similar state statute. The Court held that minors have a “significant measure” of First Amendment rights, including the right to view video games. In addition, the First Amendment’s protections don’t vary when a new and different medium for communication appears. Id. at 2733. Free speech about violence is not obscenity, and it is obscenity that the Constitution permits to be regulated. Id. at 2735. The statute here might make more sense if the state could prove a connection between violent video games and violence in minors, but it has not done so. The industry’s rating system does give protection to minors and parents. The state has not proved the compelling governmental interest and the statute does not pass strict scrutiny. Id. at 2737.

Question 9: A criminal defendant was convicted of robbery and sentenced to ten years in prison, starting on Jan. 1, 2000. Sec. 204 of the state penal code provided for early release for good behavior, and under that provision he would have been granted supervised release as of Jan. 1, 2007. On Feb. 1, 2006, the state legislature repealed Sec. 204 and passed Sec. 205a. It reduced the good time credits for anyone convicted from that date onward, and also for anyone in prison as of the date of the section’s passage. The new release date was calculated to be Jan. 1, 2009. The criminal defendant brought a habeas corpus action arguing that Sec. 205a was an unenforceable ex post facto law as to him. The state courts turned him down saying that good time credit was a privilege and not a vested right. The case ultimately came before the U.S. Supreme Court. Did the Supreme Court invalidate Sec. 205a as an unconstitutional ex post facto law?

No, because good time credits were an act of grace that could be taken away at any time.
Yes, because it retrospectively increased the punishment over what was in effect when the offense was committed. (Correct answer)
Yes, because the legislature does not have the authority to pass a law that decreases good time credits for prisoners.
No, the criminal defendant did not have a vested right in the early release date.

Correct answer: Yes, because it retrospectively increased the punishment over what was in effect when the offense was committed.

The constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws forbids punishment more severe than what was applicable when the criminal act occurred. Here it was retrospective and it made the criminal defendant’s punishment more onerous. The issue of being “vested” in good time right is irrelevant in an ex post facto analysis. See Weaver v. Graham, 450 US 24 (1981).

Question 10: Some disabled veterans sued a state government alleging that the state’s courthouses were inaccessible to disabled persons. They alleged that the state violated federal laws assuring access rights to people with disabilities. The state countered that the action violated the state’s sovereign immunity under the 11th Amendment. The plaintiffs argued that the enforcement clause of the Fourteenth Amendment allowed the federal government to apply anti-discrimination measures to protect the rights of disabled persons. What is the most likely decision of the federal court based on U.S. Supreme Court precedent?

Despite the discrimination these were not fundamental rights that were protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Congress unconstitutionally abrogated state sovereign immunity by trying to apply a remedy that was not congruent and proportional to the discrimination being addressed, but instead was unduly burdensome on the states.
The right of the disabled to access the courthouse was fundamental and was guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; the remedy was not unduly burdensome or disproportionate to the harm. (Correct answer)
Those disabled persons in this case were being denied equal protection of the law, and as such, the federal statute was a proper application of the police powers of the state.

Correct answer: The right of the disabled to access the courthouse was fundamental and was guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; the remedy was not unduly burdensome or disproportionate to the harm.

The remedy was not unduly burdensome and was therefore 'congruent and proportional' to the harm intended to be remedied by the ADA. Congress had enough evidence to establish that the disabled were being denied fundamental rights that are protected by the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, among those rights being the right to access a court. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004).

Question 11: A private organization applied annually for a parade permit to march in the Italian section of the city to celebrate Italian-American Immigration Day. A group of gay, lesbian and bisexual Italian-Americans applied for a permit to join in the parade. The state, pursuant to its public accommodations law, ordered the organization to allow the group in the parade. The organization filed suit, arguing that its right to free speech and expression would be interfered with by having a group with a message different from its own. Because the group was formed to celebrate the members’ sexual orientation, the organization objected to having that message included. What is the most likely decision of the court based on U.S. Supreme Court precedent?

A parade is not a form of free speech and, as such, it can be regulated by government intrusion.
Because the group identified itself as Italian-Americans of certain sexual persuasions, the same ethnic identity gave them a right to participate equally in the parade.
A parade is a form of free speech and the state’s use of its power violates the First Amendment’s rule that the speaker has the right to choose the content of his own message. (Correct answer)
Because the parade took place under government permission, discrimination against a group due to sexual orientation was impermissible.

Correct answer: A parade is a form of free speech and the state’s use of its power violates the First Amendment’s rule that the speaker has the right to choose the content of his own message.

A parade is a form of free speech. This use of the State's power violates the fundamental rule of protection under the First Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message. The government does not have the power to compel the speaker to alter the message by including one more acceptable to others. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc. - 515 U.S. 557 (1995).

Question 12: The owner of real estate neglected to pay his real estate tax bills. The county tax bureau sent a notice by certified mail to him at the property address informing that the property would be sold at a public sale if the taxes were not paid. Nobody was home to sign for the letter and nobody claimed it. It was returned to the county marked “unclaimed.” One year later the property was advertised in the local newspaper and exposed to public sale. Prior to completing the sale, the county sent another notice to the owner that came back “unclaimed.” The buyer at the sale tried to evict the owner. The owner filed a complaint against the county and the buyer claiming a taking of his property without due process. The state courts held that the procedure complied with due process notice. The case came before the U.S. Supreme Court. What was the likely decision of the Supreme Court regarding the method of notice provided here?

Additional attempts at notice are required if at all possible when the county knows in advance that its methods were returned as unclaimed. (Correct answer)
The notice was adequate because it was sent twice and was fairly calculated to get to the right person.
Certified mail addressed to the owner of the property is always sufficient notice for due process purposes.
The county’s notice was inadequate because it must have the sheriff serve the notice personally on the owner under U.S. Supreme Court precedent.

Correct answer: Additional attempts at notice are required if at all possible when the county knows in advance that its methods were returned as unclaimed.

When a notice of a tax sale is returned as unclaimed, a State must take additional reasonable steps to attempt to provide notice to the owner prior to selling his property, if it is practicable to do so. In this case, a notice could have been posted on the front door, and the notice could have been sent also by regular mail. If the regular mail was not returned, that would indicate notice received. See Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006).

Question 13: A city school board presented a bond issue to the public for $5 million to modernize some city schools. During the public debate on the proposal, a middle school teacher had published two “letters to the editor” criticizing the “duplicitous” practices of certain school board members in using “backroom politics” to try and get the vote approved. He doubted the need for new expenditures and criticized the superintendent of schools for trying to influence teachers on the issue. After the bond issue passed, the school district brought internal charges against the teacher, and after a hearing he was fired. He brought a state court action claiming an unconstitutional interference with his First Amendment free speech rights. The claim was rejected, and the highest state appellate court upheld the termination. After hearing the case on appeal, will the United States Supreme Court uphold the teacher’s firing?

Yes, because he went too far in criticizing his own employer.
No, the teacher’s remarks were void for vagueness and couldn’t be enforced against him.
Yes, teachers are civil servants who must refrain from political issues.
No, because teachers, as informed citizens, have a constitutional right to speak out on current issues of importance. (Correct answer)

Correct answer: No, because teachers, as informed citizens, have a constitutional right to speak out on current issues of importance.

The Supreme Court has held that the public interest in having free and unhindered debate on matters of public importance—the core value of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment—is so great that the speech is protected unless such statements are shown to have been made either with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard for their truth or falsity, and there is no suggestion here of the comments being defamatory. See Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist. 205, Will County, 391 US 563 (1968). Additionally, the teacher was acting as a private citizen and not in the course of performing his duties, as distinguished by the Supreme Court's opnion in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). Thus, the teacher's speech was duly protected by the First Amendment.

Question 14: A state-funded military institute accepts only male students. The college-level school has a renowned history of producing military and government leaders. It is known for having a uniquely rigorous form of military training that builds strong character forged in the tribulations of adversity and military discipline. A woman with excellent scholastic and athletic achievements applied for admission and was turned down. She brought an injunctive action in federal court claiming a denial of equal protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The state offered to develop a parallel military school for women that would not be as physically demanding or as confrontational. Facilities and faculty would not be equal to the men’s institute because of initial budgetary restraints. In light of U.S. Supreme Court precedent, what should the federal district court rule?

There is no equal protection problem when the state offers a parallel program of education to women.
There is no equal protection problem because the unique attributes of a men-only vigorous military training program is constitutionally justified in not allowing women.
There is a denial of equal protection because the “parallel” program does not provide the same rigorous military training or the full spectrum of benefits. (Correct answer)
This may be a violation of the civil rights laws against gender discrimination but it has nothing to do with a denial of equal protection.

Correct answer: There is a denial of equal protection because the “parallel” program does not provide the same rigorous military training or the full spectrum of benefits.

The injunction must be granted – the school must accept the applicant. The idea of an alternative military school is similar to the discredited “separate but equal” argument. It is demonstrably unequal in that women do not have the same hard-core training, an equally accomplished faculty, or the prestige of graduating from the men’s institute. Parties who seek to defend gender-based government action must demonstrate an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for that action, which was not done here. There is no doubt that some women will be able to succeed and prosper in the demanding men’s institute. See United States v. Virginia, 518 US 515 (1996).

Question 15: A high school student was running for president of the student council. He was a top scholar who had been selected to be the class valedictorian. Inexplicably, he gave a campaign speech at a school assembly that was filled with graphic stories and anecdotes about the imagined sexual adventures and prowess of certain teachers and students. Several teachers and students complained. The principal suspended him for five days and retracted the valedictorian honors. The student, with his parents, sued in federal court, seeking an injunction and damages based on denial of First Amendment free speech rights. The federal courts ruled for the student but the case came before the U.S. Supreme Court for final decision. Did the Supreme Court uphold the relief granted to the student?

No, the school exercised its appropriate function of trying to restrict the use of vulgarity and offensive discourse in a high school setting where free speech may be limited. (Correct answer)
Yes, despite some inconvenience to teachers and students, the immature presentation must be tolerated in deference to the need to provide platforms for free speech to students.
No, the student had no rights to free speech, especially considering the violent disruptions in the schools in recent years.
Yes, in today’s society sexual images and sexual humor is so intertwined into the fabric of society that it is something that has to be tolerated in the interest of free speech.

Correct answer: No, the school exercised its appropriate function of trying to restrict the use of vulgarity and offensive discourse in a high school setting where free speech may be limited.

The state has interests in teaching high school students how to conduct civil and effective public discourse and in avoiding disruption of educational school activities. In a high school setting, although political expression is generally not restricted, students do not have the same latitude given to adults. See Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 US 675 (1986).

Question 16: A single mother and her two children received welfare benefits, including cash grants, medical assistance and other programs. The state welfare agency sent a letter of notification of cessation of benefits. The letter said that the family was no longer eligible but did not say why. The mother filed an action in federal court asking for an injunction against the state agency for taking their benefits without due process of law. They argued that a pre-termination hearing at the least was necessary under procedural due process requirements. What will be the court’s likely ruling?

The gratuitous nature of welfare benefits does not invoke the necessity of procedural due process rights prior to termination.
The interests of the government in preserving fiscal integrity and budgetary constraints overrides the interest of the recipient in a hearing prior to termination.
The recipients could have asked for a hearing after the termination which in this case would be sufficient for procedural due process purposes.
The recipient has a right to procedural due process through a pre-termination hearing in which the termination may be contested and evidence presented in rebuttal. (Correct answer)

Correct answer: The recipient has a right to procedural due process through a pre-termination hearing in which the termination may be contested and evidence presented in rebuttal.

Welfare benefits are a matter of statutory entitlement, and procedural due process is applicable to their termination. The recipient’s interest in receiving assistance, which provides her with essential food, clothing, housing, and medical care, coupled with the State's interest that her payments not be erroneously terminated, clearly outweighs the State's competing fiscal concerns. The stakes are too high to allow termination of aid without first giving the recipient a chance to know the case against her, to contest it and to produce evidence in rebuttal. See Goldberg v. Kelly - 397 U.S. 254 (1970).

Question 17: A group of neighbors sued an industrial plant under the provisions of the federal Clean Water Act for discharging mercury and other poisons into a river near their properties. The group asked for an injunction and civil penalties to stop the discharges. The discharges were tested and exceeded the maximum amounts of several pollutants allowable under federal regulations. After the suit was filed, the industrial plant ceased the polluting activities and was able to get its discharges into compliance, and obtained a renewal of its permit. The company then asserted that the lawsuit was moot. What was the likely decision of the federal court?

The case was moot because there was no activity that could be enjoined anymore.
The case was not moot because the propriety of granting them a new permit had to be reviewed by the court.
The case was moot because there was no longer a “case or controversy” before the court.
The case was not moot because there was always the possibility that the defendant could return to its old ways without a judicial determination. (Correct answer)

Correct answer: The case was not moot because there was always the possibility that the defendant could return to its old ways without a judicial determination.

A case might become moot if subsequent events made it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur. In this case that possibility of a resumption of illegal activities still existed. Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (1999).

Question 18: A state law required that whenever a newspaper prints an editorial criticizing a candidate for office, his character or personal record on the issues, it must provide space for the opposing candidate to reply to the criticisms. A failure to do so is a second-degree misdemeanor. A candidate demanded space for responding to an editorial in a local newspaper that was critical to his character and his candidacy. The newspaper refused to comply. The candidate brought an action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, and requesting actual and punitive damages. Based on U.S. Supreme Court precedent, what did the court likely decide?

This was a proper attempt to regulate the fairness of speech and give equal time to both sides of an issue so that a slanted opinion would not be perceived as necessarily true.
It was an improper restraint on freedom of speech, which guarantees the right to have a full discussion of the merits of the candidates and their views. (Correct answer)
This is a constitutional statute because the government has a duty to assure that a wide variety of views reach the public.
This was an unconstitutional statute because by allowing a response, the statute was favoring the criticized candidate and setting up a silent endorsement of that candidate.

Correct answer: It was an improper restraint on freedom of speech, which guarantees the right to have a full discussion of the merits of the candidates and their views.

The statute threatens the free expression of opinions by the newspaper. Newspapers might take the safe route and not comment to avoid controversy and the expense of printing a reply. The First Amendment protects the free discussion of governmental affairs, including of the candidates. Such regulation of the process is inconsistent with the guarantees of a free press. See Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).

Question 19: A state law required voters to present a photo identification card at the time of voting. If they did not, they could cast a provisional vote and present an ID within 10 days or sign an affirmation that they were unable to afford one. Actually, ID cards were free at state agencies. Disgruntled voters sued to have the provision declared unconstitutional. What was the most likely decision of the courts?

Voter ID laws are unconstitutional and not allowed to restrict free voting rights.
The law was unconstitutional because it imposed an undue burden on the old, disabled and poor.
This law was constitutional because it was not a burden for people to live up to it, and they could always file a provisional vote if need be. (Correct answer)
The law was constitutional because the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that all such laws are legitimate exercises of the police power of the state.

Correct answer: This law was constitutional because it was not a burden for people to live up to it, and they could always file a provisional vote if need be.

Because the cards are free, the trouble of going to the Bureau of Motor Vehicles, gathering required documents, and posing for a photograph is not a substantial burden on most voters' right to vote, and is not a significant increase over the usual burdens of voting. See Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 553 U.S. 181 (2008

Question 20: A law graduate applied for admission and licensing to a state bar committee. On the questionnaire she was required to complete a question that asked whether the applicant “had belonged to the Communist Party or any organization that advocated overthrow of the United States Government by force?.” It also asked for a list of all organizations joined in the past 10 years. The graduate refused to answer those two questions, citing First Amendment rights. She was denied her law license and sued the state committee. The case is accepted for review by the United States Supreme Court. What will be the most likely decision of the court?

The state has an absolute right to know the applicant’s background – she can be denied admission for failing to answer.
The state must know, in this age of terrorism, whether she has ever been involved in terrorist organizations – her license can be withheld.
The committee’s requirements are unconstitutional as violation of procedural due process, and the license must be issued.
The committee’s requirements are unconstitutional as an interference with First Amendment rights. (Correct answer)

Correct answer: The committee’s requirements are unconstitutional as an interference with First Amendment rights.

It was a denial of her First Amendment rights to refuse her admission because she declined to answer questions about her beliefs and associations. This practice can have a chilling effect and cause law students to join only organizations that would be “safe.” Law students are thus encouraged to shun unpopular or controversial organizations. A person cannot be penalized for the organizations that she has joined. In Re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23 (1971); Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1 (1971).

Question 21: Several casinos located in a state where gambling was legal placed advertisements about hotel prices and casino activities in newspapers in neighboring states that did not allow casino gambling. One of those states had a statute that prohibited advertising of casino gambling in any form or manner. A casino sued the state claiming an abridgement of First Amendment rights to free speech. The state responded that the rights of commercial speech were highly restricted and could not be used to advertise something that is illegal in the state. What would be the likely decision of the federal court regarding the statute’s constitutionality?

It is constitutional to prohibit advertising of a business’ products in a state where such products are illegal.
It is unconstitutional to bar the advertising of information about an activity that is legal in the originating state. (Correct answer)
It is constitutional because there is no right to free commercial speech.
It is unconstitutional to regulate any commercial speech as such would deny the business its substantive due process rights.

Correct answer: It is unconstitutional to bar the advertising of information about an activity that is legal in the originating state.

Commercial advertising enjoys a degree of First Amendment protection. The ads conveyed information of potential interest and value to a diverse audience -- not only to readers interested in the services offered, but also to those with a general curiosity about, or genuine interest in, the subject matter or the law of another State, and to readers seeking change of the law in the state where the ad was published. Bigelow v. Virginia - 421 U.S. 809 (1975).

Question 22: A group of women employed by a state government recently sued the state under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, on the basis of allowing the creation of a hostile work environment against them. An amendment to that act extends coverage to the states as employers. The federal district court allowed an injunction to prevent further discrimination but refused to allow money damages and legal fees against the state on the basis of 11th Amendment sovereign immunity. The plaintiffs appealed. What should the Court of Appeals decide based on the established jurisprudence regarding sovereign immunity?

There is no sovereign immunity due to the First Amendment rights of the women to protest against discrimination.
There is sovereign immunity that protects a state from any lawsuit by private citizens that the state does not authorize.
There is no sovereign immunity where the federal law provides a remedy to women in a civil rights law intended to apply the Fourteenth Amendment enforcement rights against the states. (Correct answer)
There is sovereign immunity under the Supremacy Clause and it would take a new constitutional amendment to abrogate the immunity granted to the states.

Correct answer: There is no sovereign immunity where the federal law provides a remedy to women in a civil rights law intended to apply the Fourteenth Amendment enforcement rights against the states.

The Eleventh Amendment and the state sovereignty that it embodies are limited by the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, which grants Congress authority to enforce "by appropriate legislation" the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, which themselves are significant limitations on state authority. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).

Question 23: A law in one state forbids the transportation or sale of tomatoes in the state that have a more than 10% “genetic engineering factor.” The U.S. Department of Agriculture does not use or mention genetic engineering factors in its standards for the sale and transportation of tomatoes. Tomato growers in a second state wish to ship tomatoes for sale into the first state but its tomatoes are in compliance only with the federal standards. The tomato growers’ association in the second state brought an injunctive action in federal court against the agricultural department of the first state to enjoin enforcement of the genetic engineering rule on the basis of federal preemption. According to U.S. Supreme Court precedent, how will the courts decide the preemption claim?

There is no preemption because the first state’s law does not contradict the federal law and both laws could be complied with simultaneously. (Correct answer)
The injunction will be granted because tomatoes that are in compliance with federal law never have to be approved also under a state law.
When it comes to fresh produce, federal laws will always preempt state laws, and the injunction will be granted for that reason.
The first state’s law sets standards that interfere impermissibly with the second state’s law and therefore the first state’s law is preempted.

Correct answer: There is no preemption because the first state’s law does not contradict the federal law and both laws could be complied with simultaneously.

The Supremacy clause (Article VI, clause 2) of the United States Constitution, declares the supremacy of federal laws over state laws that contradict them. The first state’s law did not contradict or frustrate the purpose of the federal law and was not preempted by it. There was no direct conflict between the federal and state statutes because it was possible to comply with both standards simultaneously. Furthermore, the federal law did not clearly set up an exclusive framework that excluded the genetic subject matter. There is a place for state consumer protection in a federal system. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963).

Question 24: A state started conducting random vehicle stops at highway roadblocks to look for drugs. A young man was driving alone when he was pulled over with 12 other cars for a narcotics detection search. About 30 officers were involved in conducting the drug searches. After the stop, officers walked drug-sniffing dogs around the young man’s car and the other cars. An officer advised each motorist that this was a brief stop for a drug checkpoint, and asked the young man and the other drivers to produce a license and registration. The officer looked over the young man for signs of drug impairment and conducted an open -view examination of the car from the driver’s side window and the other windows. The young man was not arrested but he later filed an injunctive action in a United States District Court, demanding the police be prohibited from continuing the random drug searches. The lawsuit claimed Fourth Amendment violations based on unreasonable searches and seizures. The district court dismissed the case, but on appeal, the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ordered issuance of an injunction. On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, did the plaintiff prevail in his assertion that the procedure was unconstitutional?

No, because this was a highway safety stop similar to drunk driving checkpoints, which were already declared constitutional by the Supreme Court.
No, because the dogs would indicate immediately whether there were drugs inside the car, which made the search reasonable within the Fourth Amendment.
Yes, because the stops were pursued for general crime investigation rather than highway safety, which is an unreasonable purpose not based on individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. (Correct answer)
Yes, because these roadblocks used dogs to sniff to see if there were narcotics inside the car, which is always an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.

Correct answer: Yes, because the stops were pursued for general crime investigation rather than highway safety, which is an unreasonable purpose not based on individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.

This hypothetical is modeled after Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 US 32, 41-42 (2000). A general-purpose roadblock for detecting narcotics violates the rule that searches and seizures be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. A search or seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U. S. 305, 308 (1997). The Edmond Court held that there were only limited exceptions to the general rule that a seizure must be accompanied by some measure of reasonable suspicion or probable cause against an individual motorist. The Court said it would not credit the "general interest in crime control" as justification for a regime of suspicionless stops. Because the primary purpose of these narcotics checkpoints was to uncover evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing, and not to assure highway safety or for border patrol purposes, the program contravenes the Fourth Amendment. If the court did not draw the line at roadblocks designed primarily to serve the general interest in crime control, such intrusions would become a routine part of American life. 520 U.S. at 42.

Question 25: A state started conducting random vehicle stops at highway roadblocks to look for drugs. A young man was In a civil case in federal court between two pharmaceutical companies involving a dispute over the rights to an anti-HIV drug, one of the litigants exercised some of its peremptory strikes to keep gay persons off of the jury. The other company challenged and appealed the procedure on the basis of a denial of equal protection to the prospective jurors. What was the most likely ruling of a three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals?

Substantive due process prohibits discrimination by sexual orientation in the selection of a jury.
Equal protection prohibits peremptory strikes on the basis of sexual orientation alone. (Correct answer)
The court may exercise its wide discretion in deciding the propriety of peremptory jury strikes.
The evidence indicates that gay jurors are likely to be biased regarding anti-HIV drug treatment.

Correct answer: Equal protection prohibits peremptory strikes on the basis of sexual orientation alone.

The Supreme Court has made some landmark decisions upholding equal protection and due process for persons regardless of sexual orientation. In U.S. v. Windsor, 570 U.S. ______ (2013), the Court held that provisions of the Defense of Marriage Act were unconstitutional under federal due process principles. In the instant case, it is a denial of equal protection to deny a person a seat on a jury panel due to nothing other than sexual orientation. See Smith-Kline Beecham v. Abbott (9th Cir., No. 11-17357) (2014).

Question 26: A law student and two friends were at a mall peacefully handing out fliers protesting the country’s military involvement in a Middle Eastern country. The mall owner called the police, who warned them to stop or they would be arrested. They returned the next day and continued to leaflet. The police came again and issued another warning. The law student left to avoid arrest, but his friends stayed and were arrested for criminal trespass and loitering. The law student, in an attempt to get an advance ruling on the constitutionality of the criminal ordinances and propriety of police actions, filed an action in federal court asking for declaratory relief. Based on Supreme Court precedent, how should the federal district court rule?

The declaratory relief would interfere with existing state prosecutions and would therefore be disallowed for reasons of equity and comity
With no pending prosecution, a federal plaintiff may seek a declaratory judgment that a state statute would be unconstitutionally applied against him in a threatened future prosecution. (Correct answer)
There is no pending prosecution, which means that there is no actual case or controversy to which the declaratory relief could apply.
The declaratory relief would be premature because the law student’s fears of a future arrest are entirely speculative on his part.

Correct answer: With no pending prosecution, a federal plaintiff may seek a declaratory judgment that a state statute would be unconstitutionally applied against him in a threatened future prosecution.

Federal declaratory relief may be allowed when no state prosecution is pending and a federal plaintiff shows a genuine threat of enforcement of a disputed state criminal statute. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974). This is an actual controversy under Art. III of the Constitution; this is not imaginary or speculative, and petitioner need not expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution to make his constitutional challenge.

Question 27: A “disturbing the peace” ordinance passed by a city government prohibited the “sidewalk assembly of three or more persons who conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by . . . ." A group of three college students assembled on a busy and crowded sidewalk and gave speeches about the decline of democracy in America. They were arrested and prosecuted under the ordinance. Their appeals led to challenging the constitutionality of the provision in a federal district court. What is the likely decision of the federal court?

The ordinance is constitutional because it seeks to control crowd disturbances in a congested public sidewalk.
The ordinance is unconstitutional because it denies the speakers of due process of law.
The ordinance is unconstitutional because it violates the “void-for-vagueness” doctrine. (Correct answer)
The ordinance is constitutional because it adequately tells people not to do things that would be disturbing to the common peace on a crowded sidewalk.

Correct answer: The ordinance is unconstitutional because it violates the “void-for-vagueness” doctrine.

The ordinance makes it completely subjective as to what is prohibited. Laws must give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable chance to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Second, to stop arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, laws must provide explicit standards for enforcement. A vague law gives too much unbridled power to enforce the law indiscriminately, without defining parameters.

Question 28: A state passed Public Health Law 2122(a), which provides for exemption from immunization for school age children if they are "...members of a recognized religious organization whose beliefs are opposed to immunizations..." A couple applied to the school district for an exemption from immunizations on behalf of their child. They were not members of a recognized religious organization; instead, they requested an exemption based on their personal spiritual beliefs against immunization. Will the courts declare the existing exemption to be invalid?

Yes, it will be invalidated because it cannot override the state’s interest in having its school students immunized.
No, it will not be invalidated – it is a fair exemption that the state has chosen to provide for religious groups.
Yes, it will be invalidated because when an exemption is provided it may not unfairly discriminate and favor one type of religion or religious belief over another. (Correct answer)
No, it won’t be invalidated because it is a valid exercise of the state’s right to protect the privacy of its citizens.

Correct answer: Yes, it will be invalidated because when an exemption is provided it may not unfairly discriminate and favor one type of religion or religious belief over another.

The state does not have to provide for an exemption, but where it does so provide, it cannot discriminate. Permissive accommodation of religious beliefs requires neutrality to religions and religious beliefs, or else the state becomes entangled in favoring a religion or type of religion in violation of the First Amendment's prohibition against the establishment of religion.

Question 29: A group of college students published a monthly magazine with the purpose of challenging the laws of government and the values of society, and to thus stimulate creative thinking and expression. It criticized all religions, had drawings of public officials in sexual and corrupt activities, and mocked virtually all societal values. There was a flurry of frantic complaints to state legislators, who passed a law permanently enjoining the college from publishing the magazine without first getting the prior approval of designated state authorities for each new edition. The college brought an action to declare the law unconstitutional. Will the court strike down the statute?

Yes, because it’s an illegal prior restraint on free speech. (Correct answer)
Yes, because it violates the establishment clause.
No, because the publication fell below the standards required for free speech.
No, because a “gag order” of this kind is sometimes required to stop the defamation of public officials and religious leaders.

Correct answer: Yes, because it’s an illegal prior restraint on free speech.

The law requiring prior approval for each new edition of the magazine constitutes an illegal prior restraint on free speech. Prior restraints are highly disfavored under the First Amendment because they prevent speech before it occurs, carrying a heavy presumption of unconstitutionality. The content, though critical and offensive, is protected speech, and the government cannot impose such a broad pre-publication censorship scheme.

Question 30: A state program granted tuition assistance to qualified low-income high school students to advance their educations in private schools of their choice. Most of the private schools participating in the program were affiliated with religious institutions. The parents applied the tuition vouchers independently without interference by the state. Choosing a religious school provided for a smaller amount than if a public-related charter or community school was chosen. Some parents sued the superintendent of the state schools to enjoin the program because it was an establishment of religion. What is the most likely decision of the court based on U.S. Supreme Court precedent?

The program was constitutional because it was a neutral program that did not involve the state’s favoring one religion or the favoring of religion over non-religion. (Correct answer)
The program was constitutional because it guaranteed freedom of religion to those Catholic students and others who wanted to study in a school supportive of their religious beliefs.
The program was unconstitutional because religious schools were the majority of schools benefitted, which in turn was a de facto creation of a state preference for a religious education.
The program was unconstitutional because it created a discriminatory effect against public schools and made them doubly unable to make progress as educational institutions.

Correct answer: The program was constitutional because it was a neutral program that did not involve the state’s favoring one religion or the favoring of religion over non-religion.

The program is constitutional under the Establishment Clause because it is neutral with respect to religion. The Supreme Court has held that school voucher programs are permissible if they provide benefits directly to a broad class of individuals, who then make independent choices about where to use those benefits, without the state favoring religious institutions. Here, the tuition assistance goes to low-income students who choose their schools, and the program does not favor religious schools over non-religious ones.

Constitutional Law MBE Practice Test 2026

A church located in a western state was a branch of a church originating in a South American country.
It received a large shipment from its home church of a special hallucinogenic tea that is used in the church’s sacramental religious services.
The federal government seized the shipment, preventing the religious use of the tea.
The church filed for an injunction requesting permission to import the tea for religious purposes and to prohibit any federal prosecutions.
The government presented no evidence as to the dangers of the tea or reasons to outlaw it other than an analysis of its ingredients contained a natural chemical compound that was listed as a Schedule I prohibited substance.
What is the most likely decision of the federal district court to the petition of the church?